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I. INTRODUCTION
Tort law addresses an elemental question: When is a citizen li-
able for the physical harm he accidentally causes?' The answer lies in
the confluence of competing policy considerations, including the need
to compensate injured victims, promote personal responsibility, en-
courage socially and economically productive conduct, and discourage
irresponsible conduct. An overarching imperative is that the civil jus-
tice system, and the judiciary in general, be perceived as fair and re-
sponsive to common sense.
Early on, American common law adopted a fault-based tort sys-
tem to accommodate the competing interests inherent in this area of
* Managing shareholder, Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida.
B.A., Eckerd College, 1975; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1978; Special Coun-
sel, T.R.U.E. Coalition and affiliated business interests in tort reform efforts before the
Florida Legislature. .
** Associate, Rumberger, Kirk & Caldwell, P.A., Tallahassee, Florida. B.A., Florida
State University, 1995; J.D., Florida State University College of Law, 1998. The authors
wish to thank Mari-Jo Lewis-Wilkinson for her invaluable assistance in writing this arti-
cle.
1. See CHARLES 0. GREGORY ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 47 (3d ed.
1977).
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law. In 1843, a New York Superior Court judge described tort law's
underpinnings in this way:
No case or principle can be found, or, if found, can be maintained,
subjecting an individual to liability for an act done without fault
on his part. All the cases concede that an injury arising from inevi-
table accident, or, which in law or reason is the same thing, from
an act that ordinary human care and foresight are not able to
guard against, is but the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays no
foundation for legal responsibility.2
Equating liability with fault is a form of rough social justice
where injured victims are compensated, but innocent actors are not
victimized by liability they did not cause.
Unless my act is of a nature to threaten others, unless under the
circumstances a prudent man would have foreseen the possibility
of harm, it is no more justifiable to make me indemnify my
neighbor against the consequences, than to make me do the same
thing if I had fallen upon him in a fit, or to compel me to ensure
him against lightning.'
Florida fully embraced fault-based tort compensation as early as
1899. 4 In the 1973 Hoffman v. Jones decision,5 the Florida Supreme
Court confirmed the primacy of a fault-based system: "In the field of
tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be reached by a
court is the equation of liability with fault.16 The supreme court reaf-
firmed the Hoffman decision in Fabre v. Matin,7 holding that "[t]here
is nothing inherently fair about a defendant who is 10% at fault pay-
ing 100% of the loss."8
Historical anomalies and the intercession of competing judicial
philosophies have eroded the core principles of a fault-based system
and moved Florida away from the Hoffman ideal. The illicit union of
joint and several liability with pure comparative fault9 has resulted
in instances where a plaintiff can receive damages even if ninety-
nine percent at fault for his own injuries; yet, a defendant might well
have to pay more than his fair share of a loss. The adoption of strict
2. Id. at 73 (quoting Nelson, J., in Laidlaw v. Sage, 25 N.Y.S. 955, 958 (1893)).
3. OLIVER WENDELL HoLmES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881).
4. See Florida Cent. & Penninsular R.R. Co. v. Foxworth, 25 So. 338 (Fla. 1899)
(holding, in part, that a widow may recover damages for the death of her husband caused
by a railroad company's wrongful act).
5. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
6. Id. at 438.
7. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
8. Id. at 1187 (quoting Brown v. Keill, 580 P.2d 867, 874 (Kan. 1978)).
9. See FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1999), amended by the Tort Reform Act effective Oct.
1, 1999, ch. 99-225, § 27, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1419.
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product liability," without a statute of repose, has meant that a
seller of a product in Florida can be held liable for injuries arising
from a product manufactured and first distributed fifty years ago
without any proof of fault. Similarly, the absolute liability of an inno-
cent automobile owner for damages caused by a driver has sup-
planted fault-based compensation with a distorted form of social wel-
fare compensation without the efficiencies or fairness of no-fault in-
surance."
Florida's Tort Reform Act"2 keeps faith with the spirit of Hoffman
v. Jones that liability should equate with fault. The Tort Reform Act
restores balance to a system that at times discourages productive
conduct and encourages antisocial conduct. Moreover, the Act reaf-
firms Florida's adherence to the intrinsic fairness of fault-based tort
compensation.
This Article demonstrates that the Florida Tort Reform Act is
constitutional in every respect. The Act assiduously conforms to the
Florida and Federal Constitutions and a generation of Florida Su-
preme Court precedent. After three years of intensive fact-finding
and spirited legislative debate,'3 the Florida Legislature concluded
that the Tort Reform Act will have a positive impact on Florida's
economy; citizen productivity;' 4 cost and availability of liability in-
10. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976) (adopting a strict li-
ability cause of action and holding that retailers and manufacturers can be held strictly li-
able for injuries suffered by a remote user of a product if the product was found to be
.unreasonably dangerous").
11. See generally George L. Priest, The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its
Sources, ts Effects, and Its Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 31, 35 (1991).
12. Ch. 99-225, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400.
13. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Judiciary, HB 775 (1999) Staff Analysis (final June 2,
1999) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter HB 775 Staff Analysis].
Representative Tom Warner, Repub., Stuart, former Chair of the House Committee on
Civil Justice & Claims, began hearings on tort reform in September, 1997. The 1998 Legis-
lature passed tort reform legislation, which Governor Lawton Chiles later vetoed.
During tort reform debates during the 1999 Legislative Session, the Legislature reviewed,
among other things, research from Stanford University and reports compiled by Yale law
professor George Priest and economist Hank Fishkind to draft the Tort Reform Act. See
THOMAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., LIABILITY REFORMS' CAUSES AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS: SOME
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 27 (Center for Econ. Policy Research, Stanford University, 1994)
(analyzing the economic performance of industries in states with tort reform legislation to
determine that tort reform increases economic productivity) (on file with author); see also
HENRY H. FISHIND, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF TORT REFORM ON
FLORIDA'S ECONOMY (1997); George L. Priest, Products Liability Law and the Accident
Rate, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 184 (1997).
14. See CAMPBELL ET AL., .7upra note 13 (concluding that tort reform, which reduces
liability, increases economic productivity and improves the overall economy); HB 775 Staff
Analysis, supra note 13, at 20-21 (C[The legislation] could also enhance the success and
growth of small business in Florida, the source of most new employment. In addition, busi-
ness cost savings should enhance the affordability of goods and services for all Floridi-
ans.").
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surance15 and the development of new, safer products.16 The legisla-
ture further concluded that the Tort Reform Act would enhance pub-
lic safety while demanding personal responsibility and would ensure
fair and just compensation for accident victims. 7
In Part II, this Article discusses the complementary roles of the
legislature and judiciary in adapting tort law to meet the needs of all
Florida citizens. Part III explains the vital role of the stare decisis
doctrine in the Florida Supreme Court's ultimate determination as to
the constitutionality of the Act. Part IV illuminates the constitu-
tional underpinnings of each of the major reforms adopted by the
Florida Legislature. Finally, this Article concludes that the Tort Re-
form Act is a constitutionally valid reform package that provides
common sense, predictability, and balance to Florida's civil justice
system.
II. THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF THE LEGISLATURE AND
THE JUDICIARY IN CREATING TORT LAW
Florida's tort system is a product of cooperation and respect be-
tween the judiciary and the legislature. Traditionally, the judiciary
has deferred to the legislature to make the policy choices underlying
the civil justice system.
The lawmaking function is the chief legislative power. This func-
tion involves the exercise of discretion as to the contents of a stat-
ute, its policy or what it shall be.... The judicial branch is consti-
tutionally forbidden from exercising any powers appertaining to
the legislative branch and will not suggest a solution to this sensi-
tive problem.'
Thus, in Walt Disney World v. Wood," the Florida Supreme Court
declined to abolish joint and several liability, concluding that the leg-
islature could more effectively determine whether the state's public
policy required a change. 0
15. See generally Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987) (discussing
the relationship between tort reform and the cost and availability of commercial liability
insurance).
16. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Illinois Tort La w: A Rich History of Cooperation and
Respect Between the Courts and the Legislature, 28 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 745, 746 (1997) (dis-
cussing the fact that effective tort law removes truly defective products from the market-
place).
17. See HB 775 Staff Analysis, supra note 13, at 21; see also Schwartz et al., supra
note 16, at 745 (discussing the practical effects of tort law).
18. State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 433 (Fla. 1972) (citations omitted); see also State
v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 343 (Fla. 1997); Hamilton v. State, 366 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1978);
Moore v. State, 343 So. 2d 601, 603-04 (Fla. 1977); Adams v. Sutton, 212 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla.
1968); McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428, 430 n.6 (Fla. 1966).
19. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
20. See id. at 202. The Florida Supreme Court has consistently recognized that policy
decisions belong with the legislature. "[A]t the heart of the issue lies a policy question
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On occasion, however, when many years of "great social upheaval"
compel it, the court will adopt new tort law concepts, as it did when it
moved Florida closer to a true fault-based system in Hoffman v.
Jones."
The nobelest example of comity between the branches of govern-
ment in fashioning Florida's civil justice system is found in the adop-
tion of the FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE.22 Prompted by the formulation
of a new federal evidence code and lingering inequities in Florida's
code, the Florida Legislature adopted a new code in 1976.13 Oppo-
nents challenged its constitutionality, arguing that it encroached on
the Florida Supreme Court's rulemaking authority. 4 The issue was
difficult, because evidence rules have both procedural and substan-
tive components to them. 5 Rather than ignore and negate the sub-
stantive policy choices made by the legislature, the court avoided the
constitutional clash by adopting the changes as rules of procedure. 2
The Tort Reform Act provides that if any legislative provision is
procedural, the Court should construe those provisions as requests
for rule changes rather than legislative mandates. 27 Florida's citizens
and the civil justice system have benefited from this cooperative
spirit between the judicial and legislative branches.
A. Tort Compensation and the Legislative Process
Tort law has a profound impact on the state's social, moral, and
economic fabric.28 Courts and commentators agree that the legislative
process is best suited to analyze and create comprehensive reform in
tort compensation.2 9 "How society chooses to compensate its tort vic-
which calls for a delicate balancing of societal needs and individual concerns more appro-
priately accomplished by the legislature." State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1194 (Fla.
1986).
21. 280 So. 2d 431, 435-36 (Fla. 1973) (recognizing that many years of "great social
upheaval" in the tort arena required the court to abandon the doctrine of contributory neg-
ligence in favor of comparative negligence).
22. The FLORIDA EVIDENCE CODE is codified in chapter 90, Florida Statutes (1999).
23. See Act effective July 1, 1977, ch. 76-237, 1976 Fla. Laws 556.
24. See In Re Florida Evidence Code, 372 So. 2d 1369, 1369 (Fla. 1979).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 1369-70.
27. See ch. 99-225, § 34, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1428:
It is the intent of this act and the Legislature to accord the utmost comity and
respect to the constitutional prerogative of Florida's Judiciary, and nothing in
this act should be construed as any effort to impinge upon those prerogatives.
To that end,... the Legislature hereby declares its intent that any such provi-
sion be construed as a request for rule change.... and not as a mandatory leg-
islative directive.
28. See HB 775 Staff Analysis, supra note 13, at 21; see also CAMPBELL ET AL., supra
note 13; Schwartz et al., supra note 16, at 746 (discussing the profound impacts that tort
law has on society).
29. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) C'Legislative bodies have broad
scope to experiment with economic problems."); see also FLA. CONST. art. III (discussing
20001
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tims is a matter of public policy, shaped by interested parties on all
sides of the issue.130 The legislature provides the only governmental
forum sufficiently broad-based, inclusive, and well-staffed to analyze,
discuss, and accommodate the many complex issues involved in such
a debate.31
The Florida Legislature relied upon these institutional strengths
in passing the Tort Reform Act. Legislators gathered mountains of
information from a broad range of sources, entertained comments
from a diverse group of citizens and interests, reviewed cumulative
data and surveys, and decided to experiment with new ideas to im-
prove the tort system. 2 Furthermore, the legislature conducted its
reform work in the public arena-subject to public scrutiny-lending
legitimacy and fairness to the process.33
B. The Incremental Nature ofJudge-Made Law
As the Florida Supreme Court has noted, "of the three branches of
government, the judiciary is the least capable of receiving public in-
put and resolving broad public policy questions based on a societal
the scope of the legislative power); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423-
25 (1952) (stating that legislatures have constitutional authority to experiment with new
techniques in "business, economic, and social affairs"); State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 343
(Fla. 1997) (noting that "the making of social policy is a matter within the purview of the
legislature."); Schwartz et al., supra note 16, at 750-53 ("The rationale for legislative pre-
eminence in deciding public policy relates to the inherent strengths of the legislative proc-
ess."); Victor E. Schwartz et al., Who Should Make America's Tort Law." Courts or Legisla-
tures7 in ORIGINAL PAPERS SERIES 13 (Washington Legal Found. ed. 1997) ('Broad and
complex tort policy issues ... are more appropriately left to legislatures, because of their
ability to hear from a wide array of witnesses and create prospective rules of law.") [here-
inafter Schwartz et al., America's Tort La na.
30. John E. Muench & Robert M. Dow, Jr., When Judicial Activism Trumps Tort Re.
form: The Illinois Experience, in CRITICAL LEGAL ISSUES: WORKING PAPER SERIES No. 85,
14 (Wash. Legal Found. 1998); see also McNayr v. Kelly, 184 So. 2d 428, 430 n.6 (Fla. 1966)
("Historically, the Legislature draws the fine lines between lawful and unlawful conduct
and between acts which are the basis for actions for damages.") Florida's legislature was
the first to create the state's tort law. See Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law, supra note
29, at 3:
Legislatures, not courts, were the first to create state tort law.... [L]egislators
delegated to state courts the authority to develop the English Common Law in
accordance with the "public policy" of the state [via legislation known as a "re-
ception statute"] .... Early state legislatures delegated the task of developing
tort law to state judiciaries [through these reception statutes].
Florida's reception statute is codified at section 2.01, Florida Statutes (1999).
31. See Schwartz et al., supra note 16, at 750-53; Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law,
supra note 29, at 13; see also State v. Ashley, 701 So. 2d 338, 343 (Fla. 1997) (Harding, J.,
concurring) (indicating that policy, social, and moral issues are for legislative, not judicial,
determination); State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1194 (Fla. 1986) (discussing the legisla-
ture's primary role in policy decisions).
32. See HB 775 Staff Analysis, supra note 13, at 21.
33. See Schwartz et al., supra note 16, at 751-53; Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law,
supra note 29, at 7-10.
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consensus."3 4 Courts make decisions based on the individual facts of a
case and fashion a remedy to address particular litigants' needs.35
The judiciary's role in creating policy is usually incremental, filling
in the interstices of common-law principles or legislative acts. Absent
great social upheaval or overwhelming need, the judiciary leaves
substantive civil justice reform to the legislature.36
Accordingly, courts usually defer to legislative policy decisions,
especially those affecting economic and business affairs like those
underlying the Tort Reform Act.
3 7
Under the system of government created by our Constitution, it is
up to legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility
of legislation.
... We have returned to the original constitutional proposition
that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.'
Florida courts have followed this deferential standard when asked
to review legislation. 9 The judiciary presumes that legislative en-
actments are valid, and courts will construe statutes to avoid conflict
34. Ashley, 701 So. 2d at 343.
35. See Schwartz et al., supra note 16, at 751-53; see also Richard Pierce, Institu-
tional Aspects of Tort Reform, 73 CAL. L. REV. 917, 922-31 (1985) (discussing limitations
imposed on the judiciary's ability to adequately reform the tort litigation system);
Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law, supra note 29, at 7-10, 13-14.
36. See Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1987).
37. See, e.g., id. (deferring to the legislature's determination regarding the appor-
tionment of damages under joint and several liability); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., v. Mis-
souri 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) (holding that courts should leave "debatable issues as re-
spects business, economic, and social affairs" to legislative determination).
38. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963); see also Kahn v. Shevin, 416
U.S. 351, 356 n.10 (1974). One commentator summarizes the policy as follows:
When the legislature has declared, by law, the public policy of the State, the
judicial department must remain silent, and if a modification or change of such
policy is desired, "the law-making department must be applied to, and not the
judiciary, whose function is to declare the law but not to make it."
Schwartz et al., America's Tort Law, supra note 29, at 13-14, 25-26 (quoting Roanoke
Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 461 N.E.2d 1365, 1371 (Ill. 1984)).
39. See, e.g., Hamilton v. State, 366 So. 2d 8, 10 (Fla. 1978) ("The Legislature has a
great deal of discretion in determining what measures are necessary for the public's pro-
tection, and this court will not, and may not, substitute its judgment for that of the Legis-
lature insofar as the wisdom or policy of the act is concerned."); Moore v. State, 343 So. 2d
601 (Fla. 1977) (holding that courts are precluded from interjecting personal opinions re-
garding a statute's efficacy or wisdom); State v. Barquet, 262 So. 2d 431, 437-38 (Fla. 1972)
(stating that courts should defer to the legislature on social and moral issues); Ball v.
Branch, 16 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 1944) ('Courts are never permitted to strike down an act
of the Legislature because it fails to square with their individual social or economic theo-
ries or what they deem to be sound public policy."); Barnes v. B.K. Credit Serv., Inc., 461
So. 2d 217, 219 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (holding that courts cannot substitute judicial judg-
ment for the legislature's determination as to wisdom of a statute).
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with the state and federal constitutions.4 For example, Florida
courts have deferred to legislative determinations regarding the vi-
ability of joint and several liability in Florida's comparative negli-
gence system, 41 capping non-economic damages in medical malprac-
tice actions,42 recognizing a right to punitive damages,4 and abrogat-
ing affirmative defenses. 4
In 1996, the Florida Supreme Court noted that "the legislature
must have the freedom to craft causes of action to meet society's
changing needs.."45 The Tort Reform Act is the thoughtful product of
that constitutional prerogative. The policy choices reflected in the Act
are appropriately subject to public debate; but, the right of the legis-
lature to make those choices and the deference to be accorded them
are clear.
III. THE RULE OF STARE DECIsIS
While the 1999 Florida Legislature had the duty of evaluating the
wisdom and policies of tort reform, the Florida Supreme Court will
ultimately be responsible for determining the constitutionality of the
Tort Reform Act.4 Such a review will not be the Court's first consti-
tutional examination of tort reform issues. 47 As a result, the Court's
precedents in this area will play a significant role in review of this
legislation.
40. See, e.g., State v. Bales, 343 So. 2d 9, 11 (Fla. 1977) C(If any state of facts, known
or to be assumed, justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends."); McElrath v. Burley,
707 So. 2d 836, 838-39 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) ('Whenever reasonably possible and consistent
with the protection of constitutional rights, courts will construe statutes in such a manner
as to avoid conflict with the constitution.").
41. See, e.g., Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1987); Smith v.
Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1091 (Fla. 1987).
42. See University of Miami v. Echarte, 618 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 1993).
43. See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
44. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1250-52 (Fla. 1996).
45. Id. at 1257.
46. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 729, 730 (1963) ('CThe criterion of constitutional-
ity is not whether we believe the law to be for the public good."); see also Adams v. Sutton,
212 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1968) ('Tihe limits [sic] of the court's authority is to measure the va-
lidity of the legislative enactment by the requirements of the controlling law."); Ball v.
Branch, 16 So. 2d 524, 525 (Fla. 1944) ('[C]onstitutional validity must turn on the applica-
tion of well settled rules of interpretation and not on the philosophy or predilection of
judges as to what the law ought to be.").
47. See, e.g., Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d at 1239 (reviewing the consti-
tutionality of the 1994 amendments to the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act); Echarte,
618 So. 2d at 189 (reviewing statutes providing caps on non-economic damages in medical
malpractice claims); Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 800 (reviewing punitive damages statutes);
Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1080 (Fla. 1987) (reviewing the constitution-
ality of the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986); Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d
657, 657 (Fla, 1985) (reviewing the constitutionality of a statute of repose for product li-
ability actions).
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The rule of stare decisis mandates that courts adhere to their own
precedents. 48 At least four of the current Florida Supreme Court Jus-
tices have addressed stare decisis in recent years, illustrating the
doctrine's continued importance. 49 "Respect for the rule of stare de-
cisis impels us to follow the precedents we find to have governed this
question for so long. This is especially true where the argument to
change is persuasive but not overwhelming. 50
Stare decisis is so vital to the judicial process that departure from
it is appropriate only in limited circumstances.5' Adhering to prece-
dent provides stability and predictability to the process of judicial re-
view and allows citizens to rely on developed legal principles. 52 Such
considerations are particularly important in commercial and eco-
nomic affairs where stability and precision are essential when plan-
48. See John Paul Stevens, The Life Span ofa Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1,
1-2 (1983) (discussing the interplay between stare decisis and the "Rule of Four" which the
Supreme Court follows in processing its certiorari docket); see also Flowers v. U.S., 764
F.2d 759, 761 (11th Cir. 1985) ('Stare decisis means that like facts will receive like treat-
ment in a court of law."); Forman v. Florida Land Holding Corp., 102 So. 2d 596, 598 (Fla.
1958) (holding that the purpose of stare decisis is "to maintain stability in the law").
49. See Zakrzewski v. State, 717 So. 2d 488, 496 n.5 (Fla. 1998) (Anstead, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Blanco v. State, 706 So. 2d 7, 12 (Fla. 1997) (Wells, J.,
dissenting); Snyder v. Davis, 699 So. 2d 999, 1007-08 (Fla. 1997) (Harding, J., dissenting);
State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1023 (Fla. 1995) (Harding, J., dissenting); Perez v. State,
620 So. 2d 1256, 1266-68 (Fla. 1993) (Shaw, J., dissenting). Before he retired, Justice Over-
ton also wrote persuasively regarding the value of stare decisis. See Perez, 620 So. 2d at
1258-61 (describing stare decisis as an "essential part of our judicial system and philoso
phy of law").
50. Zakrzewski, 717 So. 2d at 496 n.5 (quoting Old Plantation Corp. v. Maule Indus
Inc., 68 So. 2d 180, 183 (Fla. 1953)).
51. For example, departure from the rule is appropriate to vindicate other, overriding
principles of law; to remedy continued injustice; or to keep the law current in light of sig-
nificant intervening events that render prior decisions meaningless. See Haag v. State, 591
So. 2d 614, 618 (Fla. 1992) ("It is a rule [of law] that precedent must be followed except
when departure is necessary to vindicate other principles of law or to remedy continued in-
justice.") (emphasis added); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55
(1992) (discussing the "prudential and pragmatic" issues the Supreme Court considers
when applying the doctrine of stare decisis); State v. Schopp, 653 So. 2d 1016, 1023 (Fla.
1995) (Harding, J., dissenting) (stating that any change from prior law must be principled).
Other considerations include the impact that overruling precedent wil have on settled ex-
pectations of the law and the possibility of frustrating the public's confidence in well-
established rules of law. See Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1259 (quoting Stevens, supra note 48, at
9); see also Snyder, 699 So. 2d at 1007-08 (Harding, J., dissenting); Schopp, 653 So. 2d at
1023 (Harding, J., dissenting) ("Where a rule of law has been adopted after reasoned con-
sideration and then strictly followed over the course of years, the rule should not be aban-
doned without a change in the circumstances that justified its adoption.")
52. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991) ('Adhering to precedent 'is usu-
ally the wise policy, because in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule
of law be settled ...-); Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403-04, (1970)
(discussing the "[v]ery weighty considerations [that] underlie the principle that courts
should not lightly overrule past decisions" and concluding that predictability in the law is
the "mainstay" of the doctrine); Forman v. Florida Land Holding Corp., 102 So. 2d 596, 598
(Fla. 1958) (stating that stare decisis "is considered appropriate in most instances in order
to produce consistency in the application of legal principles").
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ning for the future.5 3 Furthermore, stare decisis eliminates the need
to re-litigate every aspect of every case, thereby promoting judicial
efficiency. 4 The legislative and executive branches of government
rely heavily on judicial precedent when performing their constitu-
tional duties. 5
IV. FLORIDA'S TORT REFORM ACT: PROVIDING BALANCE
TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Florida's Tort Reform Act affects several aspects of the civil justice
system and tort law. While the Act's many provisions provide neces-
sary reform, the most significant aspects of this legislation address
the following issues: a twelve-year statute of repose applicable to
product liability actions," a plaintiffs right to recover punitive dam-
ages,57 joint and several liability, 8 the liability of non-party tortfea-
sors,'
9 vicarious liability,60 employer liability,
6
' premises liability,62
and various defenses. 63 The remainder of this Article demonstrates
that each reform rests on rock-solid constitutional ground.
A. Statute ofRepose64
Nothing is made to last forever. Yet, product manufacturers and
sellers doing business in Florida have been subjected to perpetual li-
ability for their products, even when those products have exceeded
53. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 828; see also Stevens, supra note 48, at 2 (discussing the
stabilizing effect that stare decisis has on economic relationships).
54. See Moragne, 398 U.S. at 403.
55. See Stevens, supra note 48, at 2 (discussing the effect stare decisis has on the en-
tire system of government). In fact, the 1999 Legislature relied on the Supreme Court's
prior rulings on tort issues to draft language that addresses the Court's concerns regarding
the civil justice system and tort reform. Therefore, the rule of stare decisis will play a fun-
damental role in the Florida Supreme Court's review of the Tort Reform Act's
constitutionality.
56. See ch. 99-225, §§ 11, 12, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1410 (amending FLA. STAT. §
95.031 (1997)).
57. See id. § 21, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1415 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.725 (1997)); id. §
23, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1416-18 (amending Fia. STAT. § 768.73 (1997)); id. § 24, 1999 Fla.
Laws at 1419 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.735).
58. See id. § 27, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1419 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997)).
59. See id.
60. See id. § 28, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1421 (amending FLA. STAT. § 324.021 (1997)).
61. See id. § 16, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1412 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.096 (1997)).
62. See id. § 19, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1413-14 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.075 (1997));
id. § 17, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1413 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.095 (1997)); id. § 29, 1999 Fla.
Laws at 1423 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.098).
63. See id. § 15, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1411-12 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.1256);
id. § 20, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1415 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.36).
64. A statute of limitations and a statute of repose are fundamentally different. A
statute of limitations "establish[es] a time limit within which action must be brought
measured from the time of accrual of the cause of action," while a statute of repose "cut[sJ
off the right of action after a specified time measured from the delivery of a product."
Bauld v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978).
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their expected useful lives.,5 Since 1986, Florida plaintiffs have been
permitted to sue product manufacturers and sellers for defective
products even if those products were designed and manufactured
many decades ago.66 Additionally, in 1976, the Florida Supreme
Court introduced strict liability as a cause of action in product liabil-
ity cases, thereby abandoning traditional notions of fault and privity
and expanding manufacturer and retailer liability.67
The Tort Reform Act resolves these inequities and introduces
some common sense into Florida's product liability laws.68 The legis-
lature determined that Florida should join the growing number of
states whose statutes of repose apply to product liability actions.69
Recognizing technology's limits, the Tort Reform Act first creates a
conclusive presumption that all products--with the exception of
commercial aircraft, railroad equipment, vessels of more than 100
gross tons, and improvements to real property-have an expected
65. See Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 659-60 (Fla. 1985) (discussing that
a statute of repose protects manufacturers from perpetual liability).
66. The history of Florida's statute of repose began in 1974 when the Florida Legisla-
ture passed a twelve-year statute of repose. See Mosher v. Speedstar Div. of AMCA Inter-
nat'l, Inc., 675 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. 1996) (discussing the history of former FLA. STAT. §
95.031(2)). In 1980, however, the Florida Supreme Court declared the statute unconstitu-
tional. See Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874, 874 (Fla. 1980). In 1985, the
Court receded from Batti Us and held that the statute of repose was constitutional. See Pul-
lum, 476 So. 2d at 659-60. In 1986, the Florida Legislature responded by repealing the
statute of repose despite the court's determination of constitutionality less than one year
earlier. See Mosher, 675 So. 2d at 920; see also Doe v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics,
Inc., 614 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993) (discussing the history of the statute of re-
pose as applicable to product liability actions in Florida).
67. See West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976) (adopting a strict
liability cause of action and holding that manufacturers can be held strictly liable for inju-
ries suffered by a remote user of a product if the product was found to be "unreasonably
dangerous").
68. See ch. 99-225, §§ 11, 12, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1410 (amending FLA. STAT. §
95.031(2) (1997)). Interestingly, Florida already has a statute of repose, which is applicable
to actions based on injuries caused by improvements to real property. See FLA. STAT. §
95.11(3)(c) (1999); see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1999) (providing a statute of repose in
medical malpractice actions); FLA STAT. § 95.031(2)(a) (1999) (providing a statute of repose
in fraud actions).
69. Many states have traditional statutes of repose. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-
577a(a) (1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-11(b)(2) (1998); ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/13-213(b) (West
1998); IND. CODE § 34-20-3-1 (1999); IOWA CODE § 614.1(2A) (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-
224(2) (1998); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-50(a)(6); 1-52(16) (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-
08(1) (1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(1) (1997); TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §
16.012(b) (West 1997).
Many states have statutes of repose that employ presumptions and/or "useful life" analy-
sis. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(3) (1997); IDAHO CODE § 6-1303(2) (1997); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3303 (1997); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (West 1998); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.5805(9) (1998); MINN. STAT. § 604.03(1) (Michie 1998); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-
28-103(a) (1997); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.060(2) (1998).
Although Arkansas does not have a statute of repose, the Arkansas Code states that a
consumer's use of a product beyond its anticipated life, where the consumer knew or
should have known the anticipated life of the product, may be considered as evidence of the
consumer's fault. See AR. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(c) (Michie 1997).
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useful life of ten years or less.10 With this presumption in place, the
Act creates a statute of repose that bars all actions for injuries
caused by a product when those injuries occur more than twelve
years after the product left the manufacturer." Accordingly, plain-
tiffs must file suit during the expected useful life of the product, plus
two years.7 2 If a manufacturer expressly warrants that a particular
product has an expected useful life of more than ten years, then the
statute of repose bars all actions for injuries occurring after the war-
ranted useful life has expired or twelve years after the product has
left the manufacturer's hands, whichever is later.7 3
The Florida Legislature drafted this statute of repose narrowly to
protect the constitutional rights of plaintiffs and manufacturers
alike. For example, the legislature heeded the Florida Supreme
Court's ruling in Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc.4 and its
progeny75 by enacting an exception for injuries that occur during the
repose period but do not manifest themselves until after the repose
period has expired.7 6 In Diamond, the plaintiff alleged that she began
developing cancerous and pre-cancerous conditions during puberty
that were linked to her ingestion of the drug known as diethylstilbe-
strol (DES) while she was still a fetus.77 The Florida Supreme Court
held that due to the delay between the mother's ingestion of the drug
during pregnancy and the manifestation of the daughter's injuries
during puberty, DES and similar cases-asbestos cases,7" for exam-
pie-required special treatment under a statute of repose. 7 To en-
sure fairness for plaintiffs like the one in Diamond, the legislature
explicitly created an exception to the repose period addressing these
special circumstances.
70. See ch. 99-225, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1410 (amending FL STAT. § 95.031
(1997)).
71. See id. Statutes of repose "cut off the right of action after a specified time meas-
ured from the delivery of a product .... They do so regardless of the time of the accrual of
the cause of action or of notice of the invasion of a legal right." Bauld v. J.A. Jones Const.
Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978); see also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla.
1992); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Acosta, 612 So. 2d 1361, 1363 (Fla. 1992); Universal
Eng'g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1984).
72. See ch. 99-225, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1410.
73. Seeid
74. 97 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
75. See, e.g., Pulmosan Safety Equip. Corp. v. Barnes, No. SC94544, 2000 WL 4960
(Fla. Jan. 6, 2000); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Corcoran, 679 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1996).
76. See ch. 99-225, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1411.
77. 397 So. 2d at 671.
78. See Owens-Cornig Fiberglass Corp., 679 So. 2d at 294 (noting that injuries re-
lated to asbestos exposure are directly analogous to injuries caused by exposure to DES).
79. See Diamond, 379 So. 2d at 672; see also Owens-CorningFiberglass Corp., 679 So.
2d at 293 (discussing the import of the court's holding in Diamond) (citations omitted).
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Furthermore, the Act does not bar actions for injuries caused by
improper product maintenance or product misuse,80 nor does it pro-
tect a manufacturer from liability if the manufacturer took affirma-
tive steps to conceal known defects from consumers.81 Finally, the
legislature had the foresight to draft a savings clause, thereby ensur-
ing that the Act does not apply to any causes of action until July 1,
2003.82 Plaintiffs with causes of action accruing after the repose pe-
riod expired in their cases but before the effective date of the statute
of repose may still bring suit until July 1, 2003, as long as the statute
of limitations has not expired.83
The Florida Supreme Court has continuously recognized that
statutes of repose are "a valid legislative means to restrict or limit
causes of action in order to achieve certain public interests." 4 Indeed,
Florida's courts have expended substantial judicial effort reviewing
the constitutionality of statutes of repose applicable to injuries
caused by improvements to real property, 5 medical malpractice, 8
and defective products.87 Typically, plaintiffs challenge the validity of
these statutes based on the "access to courts" provision in the Florida
Constitution, which states that "the courts shall be open to every
80. See ch. 99.225, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1410.
81. See id.
82. See id. § 12, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1411.
83. See id.
84. Carr v. Broward County, 541 So. 2d 92, 95 (Fla. 1989); see also Pullum v. Cincin-
nati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1985); Sabal Chase Homeowners Ass'n Inc. v. Walt Dis-
ney World Co., 726 So. 2d 796, 798 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) (quoting Carr, 541 So. 2d at 95).
Many other states have declared statutes of repose constitutional. See Taylor v. Raymond
Corp., 909 F.2d 225, 227 (7th Cir. 1990); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d 276, 279
(7th Cir. 1983); Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 449 S.E.2d 602, 607 (Ga. 1994); Radke v. H.C.
Davis Sons' Mfg. Co., 486 N.W.2d 204, 206 (Neb. 1992); Mercado v. Baker, 792 P.2d 342,
343 (Idaho 1990); Sealey v. Hicks, 788 P.2d 435, 438-40 (Or. 1990); Anderson v. M.W. Kel-
logg Co., 766 P.2d 637, 645 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); Zapata v. Burns, 542 A.2d 700, 709
(Conn. 1988); Jones v. Five Star Eng'g, Inc., 717 S.W. 2d 882, 883 (Tenn. 1986); Tetterton
v. Long Mfg. Co., 332 S.E.2d 67, 71-72 (N.C. 1985).
85. See Overland Constr. Co., v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979); Bauld v. J. A.
Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 401 (Fla. 1978); Department of Transp. v. Echeverri, 736
So. 2d 791 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999); Saba] Chase Homeowners Ass'n Inc., 726 So. 2d at 799;
American Liberty Ins. Co. v. West and Conyers, Architects and Eng'rs, 491 So. 2d 573 (Fla.
2d DCA 1986) (construing the constitutionality of FLA- STAT. § 95.11(3)(c)).
86. See Damiano v. McDaniel, 689 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1997); Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d
415 (Fla. 1992); University of Miami v. Bogorff, 583 So. 2d 1000 (Fla. 1991); Carr, 541 So.
2d at 95; Doe v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics, Inc., 614 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1st DCA
1993).
87. See Melendez v. Dreis and Krump Mfg. Co., 515 So. 2d 735 (Fla. 1987); Puflum,
476 So. 2d at 657; Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980); Purk v.
Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980); American Liberty Ins. Lb., 491 So. 2d at 575
(construing FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2)).
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person for redress of an injury, and justice shall be administered
without sale, denial, or delay."' '
The legislature may restrict a litigant's access to courts as long as
a sufficient public necessity justifies the restriction. 9 In Pullum v.
Cincinnati, Inc.,90 the Florida Supreme Court recognized at least two
public necessities that justify upholding a statute of repose regarding
product liability actions. The court noted that the introduction of
strict liability in the product liability arena removes traditional no-
tions of fault and privity from product liability cases, thereby broad-
ening the scope of manufacturers' and sellers' liability.9 1 The court
also recognized that subjecting manufacturers to perpetual liability
for outdated products places an undue burden on manufacturers, jus-
tifying a restriction on access to courts.92 Notably, Florida courts, in-
cluding the Florida Supreme Court, have reaffirmed that these is-
sues alone constitute valid public necessities justifying a statute of
repose applicable to product liability actions. 9 3
In addition to these well-established public necessities, empirical
evidence also exists indicating that statutes of repose encourage
manufacturers to develop newer, safer products because manufac-
turers will no longer fear perpetual liability for their innovations. 4
88. FL& CONST. art. I, § 21. "This constitutional mandate, which has appeared in
every revision of the state constitution since 1838, has no counterpart in the federal consti-
tution and derives its scope and meaning solely from Florida case law." Overland Constr.
Co., 369 So. 2d at 573 (citations omitted). Approximately thirty-four other states have simi-
lar provisions in their constitutions. See Janice Sue Wang, State Constitutional Remedy
Provisions and Article I, Section 10 of the Washington State Constitution: The Possibility
of Greater Judicial Protection of Established Tort Causes of Action and Remedies, 64
WASH. L. REV. 203, 204 (1989).
89. See Damiano, 689 So. 2d at 1060; Kush, 616 So. 2d at 421-22; Carr, 541 So. 2d at
95; Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 660. These recent Florida Supreme Court cases, which analyze
the constitutionality of statutes of repose in light of Article I, Section 21, implicitly recede
from a strict application of the "overpowering public necessity" analysis first introduced in
Kiuger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973).
90. 476 So. 2d at 659-60. Importantly, when the Legislature enacted the statute of re-
pose at issue in Pullum, there were no legislative findings of emergency or immediate need
for the statute. See Act effective, January 1, 1975, ch. 74-382, 1974 Fla. Laws 1207, 1208.
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional. See Pullum,
476 So. 2d at 660.
91. See Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659-60. This expansion of manufacturer liability was a
significant change in circumstances, causing the court to recede from Battilla. 392 So. 2d
at 874; see also West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 86-89 (Fla. 1976) (adopting
a strict liability cause of action in a product liability context and holding that retailers and
manufacturers can be held liable for injuries suffered by a remote user of a product if the
product was found to be "unreasonably dangerous"); supra Part II and accompanying notes
(discussing circumstances in which a court can recede from the stare decisis doctrine).
92. See Pullum, 476 So. 2d at 659-60.
93. See Carr, 541 So. 2d at 95; see also Doe v. Shands Teaching Hosp. and Clinics,
Inc., 614 So. 2d 1170, 1171 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993).
94. See BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW
ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION 492 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991):
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Undoubtedly, the need to promote innovation and competition in the
marketplace constitutes reasonable grounds for limiting access to
courts. Finally, the statute of repose will make litigation more effi-
cient and cost effective by circumventing the typical problems that
arise with litigating stale claims, such as deceased witnesses and
spoliated evidence caused by the passage of time.
The statute of repose under constitutional scrutiny in Pullum was
not as narrowly tailored as the Tort Reform Act. Indeed, the statute
at issue in Pullum did not recognize that different products have dif-
ferent useful life spans, nor did it provide exceptions for a manufac-
turer's fraudulent concealment or for "Diamond plaintiffs."95 Despite
its broad application, the supreme court found the statute constitu-
tional.96 Accordingly, the current Florida Supreme Court should have
no difficulty affirming the Pullum decision and should hold that the
Tort Reform Act's statute of repose constitutes a reasonable legisla-
tive determination that Florida must provide a fair playing field for
consumers, manufacturers, and sellers alike.
97
The statute of repose in the Tort Reform Act provides a reasonable
amount of time-at least twelve years-for consumers to file suit
against manufacturers and sellers of allegedly defective products. 98
The Act also represents a reasonable legislative determination that
establishing outer limits for manufacturers' and sellers' expanded li-
ability is necessary to maintain balance in Florida's civil justice sys-
tem.
When the sun never sets on the possibility of litigation, each improvement in
method, material, or design can establish a new standard against which all of
your earlier undertakings, of no matter what vintage, will be judged. Finding a
way to do better today immediately invites an indictment of what you did less
well yesterday or twenty years ago. In that way innovation and the willingness
to develop new and better products is first discouraged and then stifled.
(citations omitted).
95. See supra Part IV.A. (discussing the provisions in the Tort Reform Act pertaining
to the statute of repose).
96. The court held that the statute of repose did not violate the "access to courts" pro-
vision or equal protection provisions of the Florida Constitution. See Pulum, 476 So. 2d at
659-60.
97. In Kush v. Lloyd, the supreme court explicitly held that the statute of repose ap-
plicable to medical malpractice actions is constitutional:
Mhe medical malpractice statute of repose represents a legislative determina-
tion that there must be an outer limit beyond which medical malpratice suits
may not be instituted. In creating a statute of repose . . . the legislature at-
tempted to balance the rights of injured persons against the exposure of health
care providers to liability for endless periods of time.
616 So. 2d 415, 421-22 (Fla. 1992); see also Damiano v. McDaniel, 689 So. 2d 1059, 1060-61
(Fla. 1997).
98. See ch. 99-225, § 11, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1410 (amending FLA. STAT. § 95.031
(1997)).
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B. Punitive Damages
In no other area of tort law is constitutional jurisprudence more
pervasive or well established than in the area of punitive damages.
The right to punitive damages is a creature of legislative will; puni-
tive damages can be modified, limited, or abolished altogether if the
legislature deems it appropriate. 99
[Plaintiffs have] no cognizable, protect[ed] right to the recovery of
punitive damages at all. Unlike the right to compensatory dam-
ages, the allowance of punitive damages is based entirely upon
considerations of public policy. Accordingly, it is clear that the very
existence of an inchoate claim for punitive damages is subject to
the plenary authority of the ultimate policy-maker under our sys-
tem, the legislature. In the exercise of that discretion, it may place
conditions upon such a recovery or even abolish it altogether .... It
cannot, then, be said that the denial of punitive damages has un-
constitutionally impaired any property rights of [plaintiffs]. '"
In the Tort Reform Act, the Florida Legislature once again exer-
cised its plenary authority and modified a plaintiffs ability to receive
punitive damages in Florida.'0 ' First, the legislature clarified the
level of conduct that gives rise to liability for punitive damages. 1"
The Tort Reform Act requires plaintiffs to prove by clear and convinc-
99. See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Mancusi, 632 So. 2d 1352, 1358 (Fla. 1994) (clarify-
ing the circumstances that distinguish whether a statute operates prospectively or retro-
spectively); Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 801 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a statute limiting
a plaintiffs right to punitive damages does not violate the plaintiffs "right to a trial by
jury, does not constitute a tax on judgments, does not deny equal protection and is not a
special law"); Smith v. Department of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1092 n.10 (Fla. 1987) (discuss-
ing whether an insurance statute met the Florida Constitution's single subject require-
ment). As the court stated in Alamo, "[tihe establishment or elimination of [a claim for pu-
nitive damages] is clearly a substantive, rather than procedural, decision of the legislature
because such a decision does, in fact, grant or eliminate a right or entitlement." 632 So. 2d
at 1358.
100. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 801-02 (citing the district court decisions in Gordon v. State,
585 So. 2d 1033, 1035-36 (Fla. 3d. DCA 1991) and Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412, 414 (Fla.
1950)) (citations omitted).
101. See ch. 99-225, § 21, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1415 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.725); id. § 22, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1416 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1997)); id. § 23,
1999 Fla. Laws at 1416-18 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.73 (1997)); id. § 24, 1999 Fla. Laws
at 1418 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.735); id. § 25, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1419 (to be codi-
fied at FA. STAT. § 768.736); id. § 26, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1419 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 768.737).
102. Prior to the enactment of the Tort Reform Act, plaintiffs had to prove that defen-
dants engaged in fraudulent, malicious, deliberately violent or oppressive conduct, or acted
with such gross negligence as to indicate a wanton disregard for the rights of others in or-
der to be entitled to punitive damages. See W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d
502, 503 (Fla. 1994); see also Campbell v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 306 So. 2d 525,
532 (Fla. 1974) (quoting Dr. P. Phillips & Sons v. Kilgore, 12 So. 2d 465, 467 (Fla. 1943)
(holding that punitive damages were available for conduct committed with "malice, moral
turpitude, [or] wantonness")). This standard was, at best, fuzzy and, at worst, incompre-
hensible.
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ing evidence that the defendant was personally guilty of intentional
misconduct or gross negligence.10 3 Once they have proven that they
are entitled to punitive damages, plaintiffs must only prove the
amount of the damages by the "greater weight of the evidence."
10 4
This legislation limits, under certain circumstances, the amount of
punitive damages that plaintiffs may receive. 05 Another significant
aspect of the Tort Reform Act is its restriction on repetitive punitive
damage awards for a single course of conduct. 106 These repetitive
awards effectively punish a defendant time and time again for the
same conduct, thereby threatening to deplete resources in Florida.10 7
As one commentator noted: "Repetitive and unrestrained punitive li-
ability for a single course of conduct threatens aggregate punishment
that is, by any sensible standard, excessive and unfair."'' 08 In 1994,
the Florida Supreme Court recognized the potential for these abuses
and noted that legislative reform was the proper vehicle for change
in this area of tort law. 09 As a result, the Florida Legislature at-
tempted to re-establish equity in tort litigation by restricting repeti-
tive punitive damage awards."0
In fact, the legislature did not have to search long for reasons to
amend Florida's law in its entirety with regard to punitive damages.
As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has noted, an
103. Ch. 99-225 § 21, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1415 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.725); id. § 22, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1416 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1997)). This leg-
islation defines "intentional misconduct" as conduct the defendant knew was wrongful and
had high probability that it would result in injury or damage to the plaintiff but intention-
ally pursued it anyway. Id. The term "gross negligence" is defined as conduct "so reckless
or wanting in care that it constitute[s] a conscious disregard or indifference to the life,
safety, or rights of persons exposed to such conduct." Id.
104. Ch. 99-225, § 21, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1415 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.725).
105. Many other jurisdictions place caps on punitive damages. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.17.020 (Iichie 1998); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1
(1999); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/2-1115.05 (West 1999); IND. CODE § 34-51-3-4
(1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701 (1998); NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1997); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-5.14 (West 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-25 (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §
9.1 (West 1999); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 1997); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1999).
Several jurisdictions completely prohibit punitive damages. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 3546 (West 1994); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1998); MIcH. Or. RULES OF 1985,
Rule 2.114 (1999).
106. See ch. 99-225, § 23, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1417 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.73
(1997)).
107. See John Calvin Jefferies, Jr., A Comment on the onstitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986); see also Punitive Damages: Hearings on S.B. 671 and
S.B. 672 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate, 104th Cong. 95-96
(1995) (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, American Tort Reform Association).
108. Jeffries, supra note 107, at 140.
109. See W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn. v. Waters, 638 So. 2d 502, 505 (Fla. 1994) (arguing
that legislative reform was the best possible solution to this troublesome dilemma).
110. See ch. 99-225, § 23, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1417 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.73
(1997)).
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"explosion" in the size of punitive damage awards has occurred
throughout the country."' The fact that juries award punitive dam-
ages relatively infrequently is of no consequence. The mere threat of
punitive damages inflates the cost of settlement and undermines no-
tions of fairness and judicial efficiency. Even worse, the imposition of
excessive awards threatens to remove safe products from the market
and deter innovation in the marketplace. 1 2 Undeniably, punitive
awards have become so erratic and dangerous that the U.S. Supreme
Court, which typically avoids interfering in state law issues, has is-
sued several recent opinions attempting to give the states some guid-
ance in resolving these problems." 3
Because the system has run wild, the Florida Legislature exer-
cised its constitutional authority and made difficult policy decisions
limiting punitive damages in tort law and has, therefore, begun to
restore balance and fairness to Florida's civil justice system." 4
111. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 61 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting).
112. See Development in the Law: Jury Determination of Punitive Damages, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1514-15 (1997):
Potential chilling effect on the research and development of new products, ex-
cessive and socially wasteful precautions by potential defendants, deterrence of
socially desirable activities, removal of useful products from the market, and
manifest individual injustice and violations of constitutional liberties. Impor-
tantly, these harms ... can result from the mere perception by potential defen-
dants that punitive damages are imposed excessively or indiscriminately.
(citations omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998) (discussing the
sources of arbitrariness and unpredictability in punitive damage awards).
113. See, e.g., BMW of North Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (holding that an
award of two million dollars in punitive damages was grossly excessive in light of a low
level of reprehensible conduct); Honda Motor Co., v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (discussing
that unfettered rights to punitive damages may violate due process); TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (discussing "grossly excessive" punitive
damages awards); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991) (discussing due
process notions in relation to punitive damages); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989) (discussing judicial review of punitive damage
awards).
114. The Tort Reform Act also revises the common-law threshold for holding an em-
ployer vicariously liable for punitive damages based on the tortious acts of its employees.
To impose vicarious liability on an employer under the Act, the plaintiff must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the employee is personally guilty of intentional miscon-
duct or gross negligence and that the employer knowingly participated in or ratified such
conduct or engaged in gross negligence that contributed to the injury. See ch. 99-225, § 22,
1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1416 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.72 (1997)). This revises the stan-
dard of vicarious liability for punitive damages articulated by the Florida Supreme Court.
See Schropp v. Crown Eurocars, Inc., 654 So. 2d 1158, 1160 (Fla. 1995) (holding that, at
common law, an employee's acts must be willful and wanton and an employer's acts must
only be negligent in order to impose punitive liability vicariously on an employer).
FLORIDA'S TORTREFORM ACT
C. Florida's System for Apportioning Fault
The promise of Hoffman v. Jones, that "the most equitable result
that can ever be reached by a court is the equation of liability with
fault,"' remains unrealized. The legislature's 1986 adoption of com-
parative fault 1 6 and the Florida Supreme Court's decision in Fabre v.
Matin"7 moved Florida closer to Hoffman's goal, but inequities re-
main. A plaintiff who is ninety-nine percent at fault for his own inju-
ries can sue for and recover damages, while some defendants are still
forced to pay for more than their proportionate share of a loss. Such
results erode public confidence in the fairness of the civil justice sys-
tem.
The Tort Reform Act takes a modest step forward in the quest for
a true, fault-based tort system. It scales back, but does not abolish,
the remnants of joint and several liability, and it conclusively estab-
lishes that Fabre correctly reflects legislative intent."8 The supreme
court held such reforms constitutional over twelve years ago in Smith
v. Department of Insurance.119
1. Joint and Several Liability
The doctrine of joint and several liability is a remnant of contribu-
tory negligence, providing that each co-defendant is liable for the en-
tire damage to the plaintiff regardless of the percentage of fault ac-
tually attributable to each defendant. 120 Because this doctrine di-
rectly contravenes Hoffmans ideal of equating liability with fault, in
1986, the Florida Legislature abrogated joint and several liability as
it applied to non-economic damages in cases where the total damages
exceeded $25,000."2 The Florida Supreme Court upheld this statu-
115. 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
116. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-160, § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1999)); id. § 65, 1986 Fla. Laws at 760.
117. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
118. See ch. 99-225, § 27, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1419.
119. 507 So. 2d 1080, 1090-92 (Fla. 1987).
120. See id. at 1090-91 ('The doctrine was based on the assumption that injuries were
indivisible and there was no means available to apportion fault."); Agency for Health Care
Admin. v. Associated Ind. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239, 1257 (Fla. 1996). Joint and several li-
ability "allows a claimant to recover all damages from one of multiple defendants even
though that particular defendant may be the least responsible defendant in the cause."
Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1184 (Fla. 1993) (citing Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, 65
So. 8 (1914)) 'In the case of... [joint and several liability] all negligent defendants were
held responsible for the total of the plaintiffs damages regardless of the extent of each de-
fendant's fault in causing the accident.")).
121. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-160, § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws 755 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3),(5) (Supp. 1999)). See also Y.H. Invs., Inc. v. Godales, 690 So. 2d
1273, 1276 (Fla. 1997) (discussing the history of the comparative fault statute).
Other jurisdictions have limited or abolished the application of joint and several liability.
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.080(d) (Michie 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-2506(D) (1999);
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tory elimination of joint and several liability, endorsing the legisla-
ture's policy decisions:
The asserted justification for legislative modification of joint and
several liability is that the underlying basis for the doctrine no
longer exists . . . [Iln accordance with the philosophy of Hoffman,
the principles of fairness require the elimination of joint and sev-
eral liability by making each party's liability dependent on his de-
gree of fault-not on the solvency of his codefendants-and that
fairness requires at least a modification of joint and several liabil-
ity in order to balance the system. 12
2
The underlying purpose of joint and several liability is to deter-
mine "who should pay the damages caused by an insolvent tortfea-
sor."12 1 In 1986, the legislature answered that question with respect
to non-economic damages. The Tort Reform Act limits the application
of joint and several liability for economic damages, and, therefore,
links a party's responsibility to pay for actual damages to the party's
responsibility for causing the actual damages.12 4 Indeed, under the
Act, the less a defendant contributes to the harm, the less the defen-
dant will be jointly and severally liable for the damages. 125
As the Florida Supreme Court held in Walt Disney World Co. v.
Wood 26 and reaffirmed as recently as 1997,127 "the viability of the
doctrine [of joint and several liability] is a matter which should best
be decided by the legislature."1 2 8 The legislature has decided that
joint and several liability has a limited role in Florida's civil justice
system. The Tort Reform Act's limitations on joint and several liabil-
ity is another example of the judiciary and the legislature working
together to attain the Hoffman ideal.
2. Non-Party Tortfeasors: Codifying Fabre v. Matin
A fundamental element of the Tort Reform Act is the legislature's
codification and reaffirmation of the wisdom of the court's decision in
Fabre.2 1 After the court adopted comparative negligence in Hoffman
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111.5(1),(4); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-57h(g) (1999); GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 51-12-30, 51-12-31 (1999); IDAHO CODE § 6-803(3), (5)-(7) (1999).
122. Smith, 507 So. 2d at 1091 (holding that the legislative modification to joint and
several liability did not violate due process, equal protection, or right of access to the
court).
123. Id.
124. See ch. 99-225, § 27, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1419-20 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.81
(1997)).
125. See id.
126. 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
127. See Y.H. Invs., Inc. v. Godales, 690 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (declining to consider "the
abrogation of joint and several liability in deference to legislative attention to these is-
sues.").
128. Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198, 202 (Fla. 1987).
129. See ch. 99-225, § 27, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1419-20.
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v. Jones, the legislature followed suit and enacted the comparative
negligence statute in 1986.130 Courts and litigants alike, however,
struggled with whether the statute required courts and juries to ap-
portion liability to non-party tortfeasors.' 3' By 1993, Florida's district
courts had reached contradictory conclusions regarding the meaning
of this provision and its intended purpose in a comparative negli-
gence system. 3' The Fabre decision, however, resolved the conflict. 3
The plaintiff in Fabre was injured in an automobile accident while
riding as a passenger in a car driven by her husband.1 3 4 Ultimately,
the jury found that the defendant and the plaintiffs husband were
each fifty percent liable for the plaintiffs damages.135 The doctrine of
interspousal tort immunity, however, barred the plaintiff from recov-
ering any damages from her husband. 36 As a result, the trial court
apportioned one hundred percent of the damages against the defen-
dant, despite the fact that the jury determined that the defendant
was only responsible for fifty percent.3 7
Relying on both the plain language and the legislative intent of
the comparative fault statute, the supreme court reversed. 3 1
"Clearly, the only means of determining a party's percentage of fault
is to compare that party's percentage to all of the other entities who
contributed to the accident, regardless of whether they have been or
could have been joined as defendants." 139
The court determined that the legislature intended to create a
system requiring each party to pay "only in proportion to the per-
centage of fault by which that defendant contributed to the acci-
dent."1 40 Under Fabre, Florida defendants are entitled to have juries
130. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-160, § 60, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 755 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3)); see also ch. 86-160, § 65, 1986 Fla. Laws 695, 760.
131. The language in the statute, however, is clear:
APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES.-In cases to which this section applies,
the court shall enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of such
party's percentage of fault and not on the basis of the doctrine of joint and sev-
eral liability ....
FLA. STAT. § 768.81(3) (1997) (emphasis added).
132. Compare Messmer v. Teacher's Ins. Co., 588 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (hold-
ing that the comparative negligence statute permitted defendants to list non-party tortfea-
sors on the verdict form) with Fabre v. Marin, 597 So. 2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding
that the comparative negligence statute did not permit defendants to list non-party tort-
feasors on the verdict form).
133. 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
134. See id. at 1183.
135. See id.
136. See id. at 1184 (discussing the appellate court's rejection of the dotrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity).
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1185-87.
139. Id. at 1185.
140. Id.
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apportion liability to all tortfeasors involved in an accident-
regardless of whether those tortfeasors are named parties in the suit.
In 1996, in Nash v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, Inc.,14 1 the court
refined Fabre and held that in order to include a nonparty on the
verdict form, defendants must plead the nonparty's negligence as an
affirmative defense and identify the nonparty specifically. 4 2 The
court also held that the defendant has the burden to prove "that the
nonparty's fault contributed to the accident in order to include the
nonparty's name on the jury verdict [form].' ' 3
Fabre moved Florida jurisprudence toward the more just and pre-
dictable civil justice system envisioned in Hoffman. The Tort Reform
Act's codification of Fabre, as refined by Nash, simply reinforces the
common sense notions that liability should be equated with fault and
that a defendant should not have to pay more than his fair share of
the liability.
Despite its rational underpinnings, critics have attacked Fabre,
arguing that the decision "represents a policy decision that losses re-
sulting from unknown or uninsured tortfeasors should be borne by
the injured plaintiff, even when that plaintiff may totally be free
from any fault or wrongdoing." 144 As the Fabre Court itself noted,
however, such policy decisions are within the legislature's constitu-
tional authority:
[T]he legislature decided that for purposes of non-economic dam-
ages a plaintiff should take each defendant as he or she finds
them. If a defendant is insolvent, the judgment of liability of an-
other defendant is not increased. The statute requires the same re-
sult where a potential defendant is not or cannot be joined as a
party to the lawsuit.145
Furthermore, Fabre and its codification are consistent with the
goals expressed in Hoffman: to create a tort litigation system that
equates liability with fault. The Tort Reform Act is the definitive re-
affirmation of Fabre and the true legislative intent behind the 1986
comparative fault statute: to require a complete allocation of fault
among wrongdoers whether or not they are a party to the suit.
141. 678 So. 2d 1262 (Fla. 1996).
142. See id. at 1264.
143. Id.
144. See John F. Romano & Rodney G. Romano, Fabre v. Matin: Its Effect on Tort
Law-July 1, 1994 to Present, 20 NOVA L. REv. 495, 512 (1995) (arguing that Fabre is "ab-
horrent to the fundamentals of our system of justice").
145. Fabre, 623 So. 2d at 1186; see also supra Part I (discussing why the legislature is




D. Vicarious Liability ofAutomobde Owners and Lessors
Florida law subjects owners and lessors of automobiles to virtually
absolute liability when lessees and other permissive users commit
tortious acts while operating automobiles entrusted to them. Cer-
tainly, Florida is an anomaly in this area of tort law because it ad-
heres to the far-reaching "dangerous instrumentality doctrine.
' '4
This doctrine, first articulated in 1920, states:
One who authorizes and permits an instrumentality that is pecu-
liarly dangerous in its operation to be used by another on the pub-
lic highway is liable in damages for injuries to third persons
caused by the negligent operation of such instrumentality on the
highway by one so authorized by the owner.
141
Florida courts have applied this doctrine to impose vicarious li-
ability on owners of automobiles, golf carts,14 firearms, 49 forklifts'50
and other products. 15 1 Like other forms of vicarious liability, this doc-
trine imposes expansive liability based solely on owner and lessor
status rather than actual fault. Despite the fact that this doctrine
has no place in this modern era of tort law, where liability is equated
with fault, courts have been reluctant to limit it. 52 The Florida judi-
ciary's tenacious reliance on this notion of vicarious liability is
unique in the country: "Only the Courts of Florida have gone the
length of saying that an automobile is a 'dangerous instrumentality'
146. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Jackson, 617 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1993); Kraemer v.
General Motors Acceptance Corp., 572 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990) ("The dangerous in-
strumentality doctrine is unique to Florida and has been applied with very few excep-
tions.") (citations omitted).
147. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 86 So. 629, 638 (Fla. 1920); see also Ady v.
American Honda Fin. Corp., 675 So. 2d 577, 580 (Fla. 1996); Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at
1053; Raynor v. De Ia Nuez, 574 So. 2d 1091, 1094 (Fla. 1991); Kraemer, 572 So. 2d at
1365:
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial re-
sponsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the theory
that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another
is in the best position to make certain that there will be adequate resources
with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent operation.
148. See Meister v. Fisher, 462 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1984) (applying the dangerous intru-
mentality doctrine to golf carts).
149. See Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1997) (holding that a firearm
is a dangerous instrumentality).
150. See Harding v. Allen-Laux, Inc., 559 So. 2d 107 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (holding that
a forklift is a dangerous instrumentality).
151. See Eagle Stevedores, Inc. v. Thomas, 145 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962) (holding
that a tow-motor is a dangerous instrumentality).
152. See Hertz Corp., 617 So. 2d at 1053; Kraemer, 572 So. 2d at 1365 (Fla. 1990). But
see Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973); see also FLA. STAT. § 768.81 (1997)
(codifying comparative negligence).
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for which the owner remains responsible when it is negligently
driven by another."' 53
Recently, however, the Florida Supreme Court undermined the
logic of the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. In Kitchen v. K-Mart
Corp..,154 the court adopted the independent tort of negligent en-
trustment whereby an owner or lessor may be liable for injuries to
third parties if the owner or lessor negligently leases or loans a dan-
gerous instrumentality to an individual who poses foreseeable risks
to third parties. 5 By adopting this tort, which imposes direct liabil-
ity, the court weakened the premise that owners and lessors must be
vicariously liable for the actions of another person.
The Florida Legislature has not hesitated to limit the scope of the
dangerous instrumentality doctrine in light of cases like Hoffman v.
Jones, which require that liability be linked with actual fault.' In
1986, the Florida Legislature eliminated the liability of long-term
automobile lessors under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine, as
long as these lessors satisfied specific conditions regarding insurance
coverage for the leased automobile." 7 Importantly, the Florida Su-
preme Court upheld the exception as constitutional in Abdala v.
World Omni Leasing, Inc.Y5 In fact, the court held that "[l]imiting
the liability of one vicariously liable does not equate to denial of ac-
cess to court .... The legislature can determine the circumstances
permitting vicarious liability without violating" the access to courts
provision in the Florida Constitution 59 Furthermore, the court also
held that this legislatively created exception to the dangerous in-
strumentality doctrine does not violate notions of equal protection
and due process, finding that the legislature had a rational basis for
the legislation. 6 '
In light of this legislative and judicial precedent, the Florida Leg-
islature further restricted the harsh effects of the dangerous instru-
mentality doctrine in the Tort Reform Act by limiting the financial
153. W. PAGE KEETON El' AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 524 (5th ed.
1984).
154. 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1997).
155. See id. at 1208.
156. 280 So. 2d at 438 C'In the field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever
be reached by a court is the equation of liability with fault.").
157. See FLA. STAT. § 324.021(9)(b) (1997); see also Kraemer 572 So. 2d at 1366-67
(discussing the legislative intent behind this exception to the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine).
158. 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991).
159. Id. at 333.
160. The court stated:
The legislative history behind the statute indicates that the legislature recog-
nized that leases for a period in excess of one year are actually an alternative
method of financing the purchase of a motor vehicle to take advantage of cer-




liability of lessors in short-term leases and of owners who lend their
cars to permitted users.16' By reducing owners' and lessors' vicarious
liability, the legislature merely adhered to the notion in Hofman: "In
the field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be
reached by a court is the equation of liability with fault.' 16 2
The Tort Reform Act is narrowly tailored and does not limit the
doctrine of negligent entrustment as articulated in Kitchen. 63 In fact,
the Act explicitly states that this legislation in no way affects causes
of action based on the independent liability of motor vehicle owners
and lessors who negligently lease or loan a dangerous instrumental-
ity to an individual who poses foreseeable risks to third parties.1 4
The Tort Reform Act is thus a natural extension of the movement
toward limiting, if not abrogating, the dangerous instrumentality
doctrine in Florida. As the Florida Supreme Court noted in Abdala,
limiting vicarious liability in this manner is well within the legisla-
ture's constitutional authority and, therefore, is deserving of deferen-
tial judicial review. 165
E. Employer Liability
Several sections of the Tort Reform Act address the extent of an
employer's liability for the tortious acts of its employees. 166 These
provisions represent a reasonable legislative determination that the
scope of an employer's responsibility for its employees' acts must
have a logical nexus to the employer's level of knowledge about its
employees and its control over those employees' activities. In fact,
these provisions are essentially statutory codifications of evolving
case law in this expanding area of tort law.
161. See ch. 99-225, § 28, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1421-22 (amending FLA. STAT. §
324.012(9) (1997)).
162. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1993).
163. Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1204-08 (Fla. 1997) (determining liabil-
ity for a firearm seller when the seller knows the purchaser and recognizes that the pur-
chaser is intoxicated).
164. See ch. 99-225, § 28, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1421-22.
165. See 583 So. 2d at 333-34.
166. See ch. 99-225, § 16, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1412-13 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.096); id. § 17, 1999 Fla. Laws at 1413 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.095 (1997)); id. § 29,
Fla. Laws at 1423 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.098).
Section 17 of the Tort Reform Act addresses a recently-evolved cause of action for negli-
gent employment referral. In response to this expansion of employer liability, the Act pro-
vides an employer immunity from civil liability if the employer discloses information about
a former or current employee to a prospective employer unless the plaintiff can show by
clear and convincing evidence that the employer knowingly provided false information or
violated any civil right of the employee under chapter 760, Florida Statutes. This provision
in the Act is consistent with the overall legislative purpose-to provide balance to the civil
justice system. Indeed, this provision encourages employers to share information regarding
employees without the threat of litigation.
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1. Negligent Hiring
In Florida, the respondeat superior doctrine holds employers li-
able for the torts of their employees if those employees are acting
within the scope of their employment at the time they commit the
tortious act. 161 While this form of vicarious liability "reflects a policy
decision that a business should bear the cost of risks associated with
its business activities," 168 Florida law also imposes liability on em-
ployers for their employees' torts even when the employees are acting
outside the scope of employment at the time they commit the tortious
act.169 Indeed, this form of employer liability is not linked to an em-
ployee's job performance but, instead, is "grounded on negligence of
the [employer] in knowingly keeping a dangerous [employee] on the
premises which [the employer] knew or should have known was dan-
gerous and incompetent and liable to do harm.'' 71 In other words,
employers may be held independently liable for negligently hiring an
employee who poses a foreseeable risk to other individuals.'7 '
Florida courts have struggled with defining the parameters of an
employer's liability based on negligent hiring. In fact, the First and
Second District Courts of Appeal have acknowledged the "intolerable
and unfair burden" resulting from imposing liability on an employer
when no liability exists under respondeat superior.72 These courts
have demanded rational boundaries limiting such liability; 113 estab-
lishing appropriate boundaries, however, has been difficult. 7 4
167. See Stinson v. Prevatt, 94 So. 656 (Fla. 1922); see also Mercury Motors Express,
Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 1981).
168. HB 775 Staff Analysis, supra note 13, at 6.
169. See, e.g., Island City Flying Serv. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 585 So. 2d 274,
276-77 (Fla. 1991); Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 750-55 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1991); Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 437-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Abbott v. Payne,
457 So. 2d 1156, 1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Williams v. Feather Sound, Inc., 386 So. 2d
1238, 1239-41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
170. Mallory v. O'Neil, 69 So. 2d 313, 315 (Fla. 1954); see also Tallahassee Furniture
Co., 583 So. 2d at 750.
171. See Island City Flying Serv., 585 So. 2d at 276 ("Most jurisdictions, including
Florida, recognize that independent of the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is
liable for the willful tort of his employee committed against a third person if he knew or
should have known that the employee was a threat to others.") (citing Williams, 386 So. 2d
at 1239-40); see also Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 438 ("Negligent hiring occurs when, prior to the
time the employee is actually hired, the employer knew or should have known of the em-
ployee's unfitness.").
172. Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 439. Without restrictions on liability for negligent hiring, "an
employer would be an absolute guarantor and strictly liable for any acts committed by his
employee against any person under any circumstances. Such unrestricted liability would
be an intolerable and unfair burden on employers." Id.; see also Tallahassee Furniture Co.,
583 So. 2d at 750-51.
173. See Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 439; Tallahassee Furniture Co., 583 So. 2d at 750-51.
174. See Island City Flying Serv., 585 So. 2d at 276; see also Wiiams, 386 So. 2d at
1240 ('The rule [regarding an employer's duty to hire safe employees] in Florida is not al-
together clear.").
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In negligent hiring cases, courts have imposed the traditional
standard of care found in all negligence actions: a duty to act rea-
sonably under the circumstances in order to avoid foreseeable
risks.1 5 Inherent in this analysis is the scope of an employer's duty to
perform a background investigation on potential employees to
determine whether those individuals pose a foreseeable threat to
others.'s For example, in Island City Flying Service v. General Elec-
tric Credit Corporation,7 7 the Florida Supreme Court indicated that
a reasonable investigation of a prospective employee's background,
focusing on any nexus between an employee's prior bad acts and the
type of work the employee would be assigned, would relieve the em-
ployer of liability for negligent hiring if the employee committed an
intentional tort. 78
The Florida Legislature effectively codified this case law with the
Tort Reform Act and provided uniform limits on employers' liability
for negligent hiring.179 The Act creates a presumption that an em-
ployer acts reasonably and, as a result, is not liable for negligent hir-
ing when the employer conducts a background investigation, which
does not reveal any adverse information about the prospective em-
ployee. 80 This legislation is narrowly tailored and is limited to cases
when an employee commits an intentional tort.'8' Furthermore, the
legislation is specific regarding the scope of the background investi-
gation and requires employers to conduct a criminal background
check, contact references and former employers, have a prospective
employee complete a job application (including questions concerning
previous criminal convictions and status as a defendant in inten-
175. See Island City Flying Serv., 585 So. 2d at 277; Tallahassee Furniture Co., 583 So.
2d at 750; Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240 (noting that the employer "had a duty to make a
reasonable inquiry about [the employee's] background"). The Second District Court stated:
We believe that the [employer's] duty is best described as a legal duty, arising
out of the relationship between the employment in question and the particular
plaintiff, owed to a plaintiff who is within the zone of foreseeble risks created
by the employment. Once it is established that the employer owed a duty to the
particular plaintiff,... the test is whether the employer exercised the level of
care[,]which, under all the circumstances, the reasonably prudent man would
exercise in choosing or retaining an employee for the particular duties to be
performed.
Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 440 (citations omitted).
176. See Island City Flying Serv., 585 So. 2d at 276-77; see also Tallahassee Furniture
Co., 583 So. 2d at 751; Garcia, 492 So. 2d at 438, 440-41; Abbott v. Payne, 457 So. 2d 1156,
1157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240-41.
177. 585 So. 2d 274 (Fla. 1991).
178. See id. at 277. Florida courts, however, have declined to rule that employers are
required to perform criminal background checks in order to be relieved of liability for neg-
ligent hiring. See Williams, 386 So. 2d at 1240 n.8.
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tional tort actions), check the employee's driver's license record (if
relevant to the work to be assigned), and interview the prospective
employee.18 2 Finally, this provision merely raises a presumption and
considers that different circumstances may require different conduct
by employers. As a result, plaintiffs still have the opportunity to
prove that an employer acted unreasonably, and juries still may con-
clude that an employer was negligent in hiring particular employees.
This provision in the Tort Reform Act merely constitutes a codifi-
cation of the well-reasoned proposition that expanding employer li-
ability to acts committed outside the scope of an employee's job de-
scription must have limits. This provision is narrowly tailored, traces
judicial precedent, and is another example of the cooperative efforts
of the legislature and the judiciary to provide balance to Florida's
civil justice system.
2. Employee Leasing
As noted above, the respondeat superior doctrine imposes broad
liability on employers:
An employer is vicariously liable for compensatory damages result-
ing from the negligent acts of employees committed within the
scope of their employment even if the employer is without fault.
This is based upon the long-recognized public policy that victims
injured by the negligence of employees acting within the scope of
their employment should be compensated even though it means
placing vicarious liability on an innocent employer.5 3
This doctrine, which links an employer's liability to its control
over an employee's acts, becomes confusing when one employer lends
or leases an employee to another employer, thereby relinquishing
some level of control over that employee. To solve this legal conun-
drum, Florida courts recognize the well-established "borrowed ser-
vant doctrine.184 This judicially created doctrine states that an em-
ployer who lends his employee to another may be relieved of respon-
deat superior liability only if that other employer assumes complete
control of the servant.85 Shifting liability from one employer to an-
182. See id.
183. Mercury Motors Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981); see also
Abraham v. U.S., 932 F.2d 900, 902-03 (11th Cir. 1991) (discussing the Florida Supreme
Court's liberal treatment of employer liability).
184. See, e.g., Abraham, 932 F.2d at 902-03; Halifax Paving, Inc. v. Scott & Jobalia
Constr. Co., 565 So. 2d 1346, 1347 (Fla. 1990); Postal Tel. & Cable Co. v. Doyle, 167 So.
358, 360 (Fla. 1936).
185. The Florida Supreme Court stated:
It is competent for a principal to loan or farm out his servant to a third party,
and if such third party has complete dominion over the servant, and directs his
conduct at all times, he will be held responsible for his derelictions even though
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other is difficult, however, because the law recognizes the presump-
tion that a borrowed servant remains under the control of his general
employer.18 6 Therefore, these general employers must overcome the
presumption of retained control to avoid respondeat superior liabil-
ity.
The borrowed servant doctrine is important in today's market-
place where the practice of leasing employees is so common that, in
1991, the Florida Legislature established regulations to monitor em-
ployee-leasing company practices. 18 7 In fact, this legislation recog-
nizes the importance of an employer's control over a leased employee
by defining a leasing company as one that "assigns its employees to a
client and allocates the direction of and control over the leased em-
ployees."'' 8
In conjunction with this established body of law, the Tort Reform
Act contains a provision which, in essence, tracks the borrowed ser-
vant doctrine and establishes clear criteria to determine when liabil-
ity for a leased employee shifts from one employer to another.18s Un-
der this provision, an employer will avoid liability for the tortious
acts of a jointly-employed employee if the employer (1) "did not au-
thorize or direct the tortious action;"' 90 (2) "did not have actual
knowledge of the tortious conduct and fail to take appropriate ac-
tion;" 91 (3) "did not have actual control over the day-to-day job duties
of the . .. employee . .. or actual control over the portion of the job
site at which or from which the tortious conduct arose . . . and that
said control was assigned to the other employer;"' s2 (4) "is expressly
absolved ... of control over the day-to-day job duties of the" employee
by the written joint employment agreement; 9 and (5) "did not fail to
take appropriate action" upon being notified of the employee's tor-
tious act.1 94 Furthermore, this provision removes any presumption
regarding which employer has actual control over a leased employee,
thereby making the law fairer for all employers. 9 5
the principal is paying his salary; but this rule does not hold good if the princi-
pal in any way withholds control over him.
Postal, 167 So. at 360; see also Abraham, 932 F.2d at 902-03 (quoting Postal Telegraph &
Cable Co., 167 So. at 360); Halifax Paving, Inc., 565 So. 2d at 1347.
186. See Abraham, 932 F.2d at 903 (stating that an inference exists that a borrowed
servant remains in the general employ of his original employer).
187. See Act effective Jan. 1, 1992, ch. 91-93, 1991 Fla. Laws 688 (codified at FLA.
STAT. §§ 468.520-.535 (1997)) (establishing regulations for employee-leasing companies).
188. FLA. STAT. § 468.520(4) (1997).
189. See ch. 99-225, § 29, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1423.
190. FLA. STAT. § 768.098(1)(a) (1999).
191. Id. § 768.098(1)(b).
192. Id. § 768.098(1)(c).
193. Id. § 768.098(1)(d).
194. Id. § 768.098(1)(e).
195. See id. § 768.098(1).
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This provision essentially constitutes a codification of the bor-
rowed servant doctrine and provides some clear guidelines regarding
an employer's ability to shift respondeat superior liability to another
employer. Indeed, this codification builds on judicial notions of equat-
ing liability with fault and clarifies the law regarding control over
leased employees so that employers and businesses may operate as
efficiently and economically as possible.
F The "Tzespasser"Defense
Since at least 1973, the Florida Supreme Court has recognized
that "a property owner is entitled to some privacy upon his own
premises and should not be bound to those who choose to avail them-
selves of it at will."196 Based on this simple notion of private property
rights, Florida courts have struggled to protect property owners from
sweeping liability for injuries that occur to others who are on the
owner's property. 97 Premises liability, however, has proven to be a
"troublesome" area of tort law because a property owner's duty of
care differs depending on the owner's relationship to the person visit-
ing the property.'98 In fact, the Florida Supreme Court recognized the
need for "guidelines [that] the jury can apply to the facts in arriving
at a just verdict."199
In order to define the scope of a landowner's duty and the ensuing
degree of liability to visitors on his property, Florida's courts have
created several classifications of visitors.2°° In Wood v. Camp,2"' the
Florida Supreme Court noted that "the distinction of 'invited' and
'uninvited' visitor is the fairest line of demarcation" in determining
the criterion for the duty owed.2 2 Based on this distinction, the Tort
Reform Act evinces the legislature's intent to build on the Court's
logical determinations regarding a landowner's liability to trespass-
ers.
203
Under the Tort Reform Act, a property owner's only duty to an
undiscovered trespasser is to avoid intentionally harming the tres-
196. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691, 696 (Fla. 1973).
197. See id.
198. See id. at 694 (CThere is a valid distinction in the duty of care... because it is the
relationship established between persons which must be the criterion for the duty owed.");
see also Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 1972).
199. Wood, 284 So. 2d at 695.
200. See St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d 670, 676 (Fla.
1950); see also Wood, 284 So. 2d at 693-96; Post; 261 So. 2d at 147-48 (classifying visitors
as invitees, trespassers, and licensees).
201. 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973).
202. Id. at 694.
203. See ch. 99-225, § 19, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1414 (amending FLA. STAT. § 768.075
(1997)).
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passer.20 4 If the property owner discovers the presence of the tres-
passer, then the property owner's duty is to avoid intentionally
harming the trespasser as well as to warn him of any known dan-
gers. 05 Thus, the property owner's discovery of the interloper ele-
vates the landowner's duty to a trespasser. As long as landowners
perform these duties, trespassers may not recover for any injuries
that occur while they are trespassing.
The Tort Reform Act retains the "attractive nuisance doctrine. 2 6
This doctrine is an exception to a landowner's general duty to tres-
passers, and its purpose is to protect trespassing children who are
incapable of making reasonable judgments about the dangers en-
countered on a premises. 20 7 Even under the Act, trespassing children
may recover against a landowner if they are able to satisfy the ele-
ments of the doctrine.
In Abdin v. Fischer,20 1 the Florida Supreme Court upheld the con-
stitutionality of a statute that limited a property owner's liability.
20 9
The court explicitly held that the legislature has constitutional au-
thority to codify the common-law duty of care that property owners
owe certain classes of visitors.21 0 In fact, the court went even further
and held that the legislature may modify these common-law stan-
dards of care without violating the Florida Constitution, noting that
"legislative action that alters standards of care need only be reason-
able to be upheld."211
The purpose of the limits on a landowner's duty to trespassers is
to equate liability with fault. As the court has noted, a landowner has
no duty to anticipate a trespasser's presence and, thus, has no duty
to protect a trespasser's safety unless the landowner discovers the
204. See id.; see also Martinello v. B & P USA, Inc., 566 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. 1990);
Wood, 284 So. 2d at 693-94. As the court stated in Hix v. Billen:
The real reason which gave rise to the limited liability to a trespasser... is not
because his injury upon defendant's premises is of any less concern as an in-
jury, but because his presence is not likely to be anticipated, so that the owner
or occupier owes him no duty to take precautions toward his safety beyond that
of avoiding willful injury and if his presence be discovered, to give warning of
any known dangerous condition not open to ordinary observation by the...
trespasser.
284 So. 2d 209, 210 (Fla. 1973); see also Rodriguez v. Brutus, 702 So. 2d 1302, 1303 (Fla.
3d DCA 1997); Potts v. Johnson, 654 So. 2d 596, 600 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
205. See ch. 99-225, § 19, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1415; see also Martinello, 566 So. 2d at
763; HY, 284 So. 2d at 210-11; Wood, 284 So. 2d at 693-94; Dyals v. Hodges, 659 So. 2d
482, 484 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Bishop v. First Nat'l Bank of Fla., 609 So. 2d 722, 725 (Fla.
5th DCA 1992).
206. See ch. 99-225, § 19, 1999 Fla. Laws 1415.
207. See Martinello, 566 So. 2d at 762 (discussing the public policy issues supporting
the attractive nuisance doctrine).
208. 374 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1979).
209. See id. at 1381.
210. Seeid. at 1380-81.
211. Id. at 1381 (relying on Florida Supreme Court precedent).
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trespasser's presence. 1 2 Recognizing that a trespasser assumes the
risk of injury by entering another person's property, the Act limits a
trespasser's ability to recover for any injuries occurring during the
trespass.2 13 Because this is a reasonable legislative determination
based on judicial precedent, this provision of the Act is constitu-
tional.11 4
G. The "Government Rules"Defense
Before manufacturers can place their products in the stream of
commerce, they must comply with a wide array of state and federal
regulations that require products to meet certain minimum safety
specifications. 215 The importance of complying with these safety regu-
lations is reflected in Florida law, which holds that evidence of a
manufacturer's or seller's failure to comply with industry standards
is evidence that the manufacturer or seller was negligent.1 6 Simi-
larly, Florida case law recognizes that proof of a manufacturer's com-
pliance with industry standards is evidence that no defect existed.
2 17
The Tort Reform Act represents a reasonable legislative determina-
tion that the existing case law fails to adequately promote compli-
ance with these safety standards.
Florida case law does not create any presumptions that allow the
jury to link evidence of comphance--or a lack thereof-with the exis-
tence of a defect. As a result, the status quo does not fully protect
consumers or manufacturers and sellers. In fact, without a presump-
tion linking manufacturers' non-liability to their compliance with
safety standards, manufacturers are effectively subject to a jury's
whim and caprice regarding the appropriate safety standards in
product manufacturing. As one commentator notes:
There is an inherent illogic about giving little practical weight to
compliance with safety standards promulgated by an expert
212. See Hix v. Billen, 284 So. 2d 209, 210-11 (Fla. 1973) (citing Wood v. Camp, 284 So.
2d 691, 693-94 (Fla. 1987)).
213. See ch. 99-225, § 19, 1999 Fla. Laws 1414-15.
214. SeeAbdin, 374 So. 2d at 1380-81.
215. See, e.g., Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b)
(Supp. III 1997); Flammable Fabrics Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1192-93, 1203 (Supp. III 1997); Fed-
eral Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136v (Supp. III 1997); National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b) (Supp. III 1997); Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360k (Supp. III 1997); Occupational Safety and Health Act,
29 U.S.C. § 667 (Supp. IV 1998).
216. See Jackson v. H.L. Bouton Co., 630 So. 2d 1173, 1175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); see
also Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Clark, 491 So. 2d 1196, 1198 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); St.
Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. White, 369 So. 2d 1007, 1011 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979) (holding
that a violation of industry standard concerning placement and operation of railroad cross-
ing gates was evidence of negligence).
217. See, e.g., Jackson, 630 So. 2d at 1175 (holding that manufacturer's compliance
with industry standards constitutes evidence that the product is not defective).
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agency intended to avoid unreasonable risk of injury or death and
yet permitting a jury question simply because a claimant's witness
opined that the complying product was 'unreasonably dangerous'
regarding some aspect of performance covered by the standard.218
The Tort Reform Act, however, reflects the Florida Legislature's
determination to join a growing number of jurisdictions that have de-
cided to legislate greater balance into their civil justice systems. 19
While creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of consumers, the
Act also creates a rebuttable presumption in favor of manufacturers.
If the product and its components complied with applicable federal
and state regulations at the time of sale or delivery, if compliance
with those standards was required to sell or distribute the product,
and if the alleged injury is of the type that such standards are de-
signed to prevent, then manufacturers and sellers are entitled to a
rebuttable presumption that no defect existed and that no liability
attaches for the damages allegedly caused by the product. 2 0
Although this presumption was the subject of extensive legislative
debate, the constitutionality of such statutory presumptions is be-
yond question. The Florida Supreme Court has previously upheld the
constitutionality of statutory presumptions.221 In Straughn v. K & K
Land Management, the court held that a statutory presumption is
constitutional if a rational connection exists between the fact that is
presumed and the fact that is to be proven.2 2 Straughn also requires
that the party against whom the presumption arises be given a rea-
sonable opportunity to rebut the presumption. 2 3
Compliance with safety standards and the extent of a manufac-
turer's liability for its product are intertwined. Indeed, the underly-
ing purpose of safety standards is to protect consumers from the in-
evitable dangers of unsafe products. The Tort Reform Act guarantees
that plaintiffs will have a reasonable opportunity to refute this pre-
sumption. The Act clearly states that the presumption is rebuttable,
218. Christopher Scott D'Angelo, Effect of Compliance or Noncompliance with Applica-
ble Governmental Product Safety Regulations on Determination of Product Defects, 36 S.
TEX. L. REV. 453, 455 (1995) (quoting MICHAEL HOENIG, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
SUBSTANTIVE, PROCEDURAL, AND POLICY ISSUES 16 (1993)).
219. Some states consider a manufacturer's compliance with government standards as
evidence of no liability or product defect. See AR. CODE ANN. § 16-116-105(a) (Michie
1987); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (West 1992); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.72.050(1)
(1992). Some states incorporate the rebuttable presumption defense. See, e.g., COLO. REV.
STAT. § 13-21-403(1) (1997); IND. CODE § 34-20-5-1 (1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3304(a)
(1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(2) (Michie 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (West
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-104 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.3-09 (1999) UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-6(3) (1999).
220. See ch. 99-225, § 15, 1999 Fla. Laws 1412 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.1256).
221. See Straughn v. K & K Land Management, 326 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1976).
222. See id. at 424.
223. See id. ('[Tihere must be a right to rebut in a fair manner.").
20001
494 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 27:461
not conclusive.12 4 Even with this presumption in place, plaintiffs may
still offer evidence and the jury may still determine that a product is
defective, and that a manufacturer or seller is liable for injuries
caused by the defect. This presumption, therefore, meets the
Straughn standards of constitutionality.
In addition to challenging the overall constitutionality of this pre-
sumption, critics might argue that creating this rebuttable presump-
tion in favor of manufacturers effectively creates another element
that plaintiffs must prove to prevail in a product liability suit. The
legislature, however, has merely provided jurors with an opportunity
to give manufacturers and sellers the benefit of the doubt when proof
exists that their products comply with the relevant safety stan-
dards. 2 15 The jury remains absolutely free to discard this presump-
tion in its deliberations.
Well-established Florida Supreme Court precedent recognizes
that the Florida Legislature has the constitutional authority to
change the nature of a cause of action without trampling litigants'
rights.2 6 For example, in Abdin v. Fischer,2 7 the court explicitly held
that a legislative modification to a property owner's duty of care to
trespassers does not in any way violate the a parties' access to
courts.2 2 8 Similarly, the court held that the legislature may abrogate
certain affirmative defenses without violating any constitutional pro-
visions .2 2 9 As the court stated in Estate ofRoberts v. Roberts:
[Plaintiffs] argument that she has been denied access to the courts
is based upon a false premise. The legislature has not abolished
the wife's right to sue; it has only altered one of the elements that
the court may consider in determining the validity of [her claim]..
. The right to [seek redress] ... still exists.130
In accordance with this vast precedent permitting legislative
modification to causes of action, the legislature's determination to
create a rebuttable presumption in favor of manufacturers and sell-
ers in product liability cases does not, in any way, violate consumers'
224. See ch. 99-225, § 15, 1999 Fla. Laws 1412.
225. See id.
226. See Eller v. Shova, 630 So. 2d 537, 542 (Fla. 1993) (upholding the legislature's de-
termination to raise the degree of negligence necessary to maintain a workers' compensa-
tion claim); see also Estate of Roberts v. Roberts, 388 So. 2d 216, 217 (Fla. 1980) (uphold-
ing a statute that waives full disclosure for antenuptial agreement); Kluger v. White, 281
So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1973) (approving the decision in McMillan v. Nelson, 5 So. 2d 867 (Fla.
1942), that the legislature may change the degree of negligence necessary for a passenger
to sue a driver for tortious conduct).
227. 374 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1979).
228. See id. at 1380-81.
229. See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d
1239, 1253 (Fla. 1996).
230. Estate of Robart, 388 So. 2d at 217.
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constitutional rights to seek redress for allegedly defective products.
Instead, this legislation merely levels the playing field.
Finally, critics will likely argue that creating a presumption in fa-
vor of manufacturers and sellers effectively removes the issue of li-
ability from the jury. This argument, however, is disingenuous. If a
presumption in favor of a manufacturer removes the issue from jury
deliberations, then a presumption in favor of a plaintiff will just as
surely remove the issue from the jury.
In reality, these presumptions do not diminish the jury's capacity
to weigh the evidence. Instead, the jury has the opportunity to de-
termine that no defect existed in light of evidence that the manufac-
turer complied with government rules.231 In fact, after hearing evi-
dence of compliance, the jury may still find that the product was de-
fective. By creating this rebuttable presumption linking safety stan-
dard compliance to a manufacturer's non-liability, the Tort Reform
Act ultimately fosters uniformity and predictability in the applica-
tion of safety standards and further injects some common sense into
Florida's product liability laws.
H. The "Alcohol and Drug"Defense
Both the legislature and judiciary recognize the importance of
protecting all Floridians from the harms caused by drug and alcohol
abuse. For example, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol is
a criminal offense in Florida,23 2 and the legislature continues to enact
progressively harsher drunk driving laws.2 33 Similarly, Florida courts
may assess punitive damages against drunk drivers in order to dis-
courage reckless disregard for public safety.23 4 As another deterrent,
courts admit the results of blood alcohol tests (regardless of the rea-
son they were taken) in civil trials to determine the extent of a plain-
tiffs comparative negligence in causing injury. 233 The courts have
also ratified a jury instruction that uses driving under the influence
231. See ch. 99-225, § 15, 1999 Fla. Laws 1400, 1412 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
768.1256).
232. See FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (1999).
233. In 1993, the Florida Legislature amended section 316.193, Florida Statutes, to re-
duce legally permissible blood alcohol levels from .10% to .08%. See Act effective Jan. 1,
1994, ch. 93-124, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 640, 640 (amending FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (Supp.
1992)).
234. See, e.g., Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 1976); Alexander v. Alterman
Transp. Lines, Inc., 387 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980) (holding that punitive dam-
ages may be appropriately assessed against an intoxicated driver).
235. See Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 1984); Thunderbird Drive-In Thea-
tre, Inc. v. Reed, 571 So. 2d 1341, 1345 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990); Grant v. Brown, 429 So. 2d
1229, 1231 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
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as a measure of a plaintiffs comparative negligence.136 Finally, the
negligent entrustment doctrine allows a party injured by an intoxi-
cated person to sue the owner of a dangerous instrumentality for
negligently entrusting that instrumentality to an obviously impaired
person.2
37
Despite all of these measures to equate liability with fault, Flor-
ida's civil justice system still allows a drunk driver, who is primarily
responsible for his own injuries, to collect damages if another person
was partially responsible for the injuries.2 8 The Tort Reform Act
remedies in part this gross inequity and instills some common sense
into Florida's tort law.
The Tort Reform Act prohibits a plaintiff from recovering damages
for personal injury or property damage if, at the time of injury, the
plaintiffs faculties were impaired by drugs or alcohol and, as a result
of that drug or alcohol influence, the plaintiff was more than fifty
percent at fault for his own harm.2 9 This provision simply reiterates
the notion expressed in other legislative and judicial policies that




As former Chief Justice Alan Sundberg once noted: 'There can be
no question that drunk drivers endanger the lives of citizens of our
state. But the legislature can and has dealt with this problem
through enactment of criminal statutes. The legislature is the appro-
priate body to assert the public policy of Florida in this regard. 2 41 By
creating this alcohol and drug defense in the Tort Reform Act, the
legislature has exercised its constitutional authority to once again
proclaim Florida's public policy against drug and alcohol abuse.
V. CONCLUSION
We return to the two core issues in this debate: (1) the type of civil
justice system that will best serve Florida citizens and (2) the role
the Florida Legislature should play in making that choice.
In answering the first, the legislature and the Florida Supreme
Court have declared, repeatedly and in unison, that a tort system
236. See, e.g., Pinellas County v. Bettis, 659 So. 2d 1365, 1366-67 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995);
Eden v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 330 So. 2d 540, 542 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Williams v. Groo-
ver, 244 So. 2d 474, 474-75 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971).
237. See Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200, 1207-08 (Fla. 1997) (holding that
selling a gun to an obviously intoxicated person may invoke liability for injuries caused by
that intoxicated person).
238. See Livingston v. Smalley Transp. Co., 603 So. 2d 526, 527-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
(holding that an intoxicated plaintiff found 50% negligent may receive judgment for
$350,000 after the court reduces the jury award).
239. See ch. 99-225, § 20, 1999 Fla. Laws 1415.
240. See supra Part IV.H. (discussing legislative and judicial policies that punish the
abuse of drugs and alcohol).
241. Ingram v. Pettit, 340 So. 2d 922, 927 (Fla. 1976) (Sundberg, J., dissenting).
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equating liability with fault is preferable to a no-fault system of com-
pensation. 24 2 In Hoffman v. JoneS2 43 the Florida Supreme Court found
that equating liability with fault is "a more equitable system of de-
termining liability and a more socially desirable method of loss dis-
tribution. 12 44 Any no-fault-based doctrine, whether contributory neg-
ligence or joint and several liability, contravenes basic notions of fair
play:
The rule of contributory negligence is a harsh one which either
places the burden of a loss for which two are responsible upon only
one party or relegates to lady luck the determination of the dam-
ages for which each of two negligent parties will be liable. When
the negligence of more than one person contributes to the occur-
rence of an accident, each should pay the proportion of the total
damages he has caused the other party.245
In 1986, the legislature further assured the primacy of fault-based
compensation by adopting the Tort Reform and Insurance Act of
1986.24 The court approved those actions in 1993 by confirming that
"liability is to be determined on the basis of the percentage of fault of
each participant to the accident and not on the basis of solvency or
amenability to suit of other potential defendants. '247 The Tort Reform
Act inches Florida closer to that ideal.
In answering the second question, the legislature plays an essen-
tial and primary role in making the type of public policy choices un-
derlying the Tort Reform Act. Three years of fact finding, public in-
put, and intense debate yielded a product more faithful to Hoffman
ideals than existed before. The legislature created the Act, however,
only after careful scrutiny and adherence to other Florida Supreme
Court decisions, such as Pullum,2 " Smith,2 49 Walt Disney World,50
Diamond,2 ' Gordon,52 Abdala,25 3 Abdin,25
4 Fabre.2 ' 5
242. Of course, a fault-based system can never guarantee full compensation in every
case because not all tortfeasors have insurance or personal resources. A no-fault system
might well provide more efficient compensation to claimants; however, in exchange for
quick, guaranteed compensation, claimants must abandon their right to sue. See FLA.
STAT. ch. 440 (1999) (giving claimants a right to receive workers' compensation in lieu of
suing for damages); FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.7405 (1999) (providing for medical, surgical,
funeral, and disability insurance benefits without regard to fault). But, on the other hand,
liability for a claimant's damages would often be imposed on one who did nothing wrong.
The argument is largely academic, ironically, because the opponents of tort reform vehe-
mently oppose no-fault-based tort systems. Simply put, plaintiffs' lawyers will not agree to
limits on lawsuits, even if such limits might mean greater or more efficient compensation
for claimants.
243. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
244. Id. at 437.
245. Id.
246. See Act effective July 1, 1986, ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695.
247. Fabre v. Marin, 623 So. 2d 1182, 1186 (Fla. 1993).
248. Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
249. Smith v. DOI, 507 So. 2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
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At the heart of this debate "lies a policy question which calls for a
delicate balancing of societal needs and individual concerns more ap-
propriately accomplished by the Legislature."2 16  The legislature
made those difficult decisions in this Act, but only after careful and
sober regard for its own constitutional limitations. Florida's Tort Re-
form Act is both constitutional and a model of respect for the coordi-
nate branches of Florida government.
250. Walt Disney World v. Wood, 515 So. 2d 198 (Fla. 1987).
251. Diamond v. E.R. Squibb and Sons, Inc., 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
252. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
253. Abdala v. World Omni Leasing, Inc., 583 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1991).
254. Abdin v. Fischer, 374 So. 2d 1379 (Fla. 1979).
255. Fabre v. Matin, 623 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 1993).
256. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1194 (Fla. 1986).
